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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
YOSHITARO OKUDA and JACK
ARAMAKI, the sole heirs
of KIM ARAMAKI OKUDA,
Deceased,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Case No. 8399
-vs.JERRY A. ROSE,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought to recover for the
death of Kim Aramaki Okuda by reason of an autopedestrian accident. The case was tried before a jury
which returned a verdict of no cause in favor of
the defendant and respondent. The evidence shows
that the deceased was killed when struck by an
automobile driven by the defendant at about 1:30
A.M. the morning of October 25, 1953, at about
2200 South Main Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.
There was no evidenee of the deceased's activities
immediately before the accident or how she came
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to be in the street where she was struck, except
that she was struck at a point in the street anywhere from six to fifteen feet from the west side
of the street and was not in a crosswalk or at an
intersection at the time. In fact the jury could have
found that she was hit at a point directly in the
defendant's lane of travel, that being the outside
lane for southbound traffic. One of the questions
presented by this appeal is whether the court erred
under this evidence in instructing the jury as to
the deceased's right to be on the highway and her
duties while on the highway. The other question
raised by this appeal is whether the court under
this evidence should have instructed the jury that
the deceased was presumed to be exercising due
care for her ow11 safety at the time of the accident.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts set out in appellants' brief are sub,stantially correct -and we will discuss them only
briefly except in those particulars wherein we differ and when we consider the difference material
to the issues before this court.
Mrs. Kim Aramaki Okuda, a lady of Japanese
descent, seventy-five years of age, had been visiting
friends and relatives in Salt Lake City on the Saturday prior to the morning on which this accident
occurred. Saturday evening she had attended a Japanese meeting at a Buddhist Church in Salt Lake
.)
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City and had then gone to Magna, Utah to visit
her sister. Her sister's son, Saige Ararnaki, brought
Mrs. Okuda back to Salt Lake and let her out of
his automobile on First South Street between West
Temple and First West Streets at about 11:00 P.M.
Where she intended to go when she left Saige Aramaki's car is not known, except that there is a
Chinese or Japanese cafe at 1281;2 West First South
Street and she was staying just around the corner
at 33lj2 South Temple, where her husband was waiting for her at the time (R.30). IIo\v this lady, who
could not speak English and had no reason to be
in that neighborhood, came to be at 2200 South
Main Street, a point four or five miles from where
she was let out of Saige Aramaki's automobile two
and a half hours before, remains a mystery ( R.3032).
The defendant, Jerry A. Rose, whose job as
rate clerk for the Interstate Motor Lines required
that he work irregular hours, had left work about
1:00 P.M. Saturday afternoon (R. 74). On the way
home, he bought a pint of whiskey and arrived at
his home in Murray, Utah about 2:30 or 3:00 P.M.
in the afternoon. He and his wife spent the afternoon at horne, with perhaps an excursion to the
grocery store, and had had dinner at home before
going out that evening at about 8 :30 or 9 :00 P.M.
During the course of the afternoon and evening,
3
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the defendant and his wife had consumed about onehalf of the bottle of liquor. At about 8:30 or 9:00
P.M., the defendant and his wife went to the Manhattan Club in Salt Lake City, where they remained
until about 1:00 A.M. Sunday morning. Dtlring the
time they were at the Club, they consumed the rest
of the bottle of liquor.
From the Manhattan Club, the couple drove
south on Main Street to the intersection of TwentyFirst South and Main Streets, where they stopped
for a red light (R. 81).
Main Street, below Twenty-First South in the
vicinity of this accident, is approximately seventy
feet wide. There is a paved street approximately
forty feet wide down the center of the street, with
fifteen feet of gravel shoulders on either side of the
pavement. The paved portion of the highway is
marked off into four ten foot traffic lanes, two
for northbound traffic and two for southbound traffic. There is a sidewalk, at least on the west side
of the street. The Lennox Furnace Company is located on the west side of the street immediately
across from where the deceased was hit. (See diagram in appellant's brief). The nearest intersection
is one-half block away (R. 94) and the nearest street
light a block a way ( R. 93) . The area then was
relatively dark. It was raining and visibility was
poor (R. 93). There was no crosswalk in the vicinity
4
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where the accident occurred (R. 94), and the
defendant had the lights of his automobile turned
on.
As the traffic signal changed to green, the
defendant proceeded south on Main Street in the
outside lane for southbound traffic. As he and his
wife proceeded south, a gray two-toned automobile,
which the defendant thought was a 1950 or 1952
Buick (R. 81), pulled up alongside defendant's automobile. The occupants of this automobile were making a lot of noise, shouting to or at ope another
and there was a great deal of commotion going on
in the car (R. 117, 82). As this automobile passed
defendant's automobile an object struck defendant's
windshield immediately in front of and about three
inches above the steering wheel. The defendant
ducked and at the same moment heard a thud, which
appeared to come from the rear of the car ( R. 94).
Thinking that he might have hit something or had
dropped a wheel into a hole in the street, the defendant stopped his car to investigate ( R. 86).
Going back to the point where he heard the thud,
the defendant found Mrs. Okuda lying to the side
of the road ( R. 86). The woman was clothed entirely in black and was lying more or less east and
west approximately three feet from the paved portion of the highway.
Mrs. Jerry Rose substantiated her husband's
5
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story asserting as her husband had done that their
car was still on the paved portion of the highway
at the time she heard the thud. She asserted that the
body was lying about four feet from the paved
surface out onto the shoulder. There were various
articles of clothing lying about, a shoe being three
or four feet from the body, a black handbag lying
ten to twelve feet to the right and north of the body
upon the pavement, another shoe on the paved portion of the highway, and some weeds (herbs) in
a bread wrapper lying about (R. 118).
After what seemed five to ten minutes, a boy
came along and the defendant sent him to get an
ambulance (R. 119). After that a crowd gathered
in which the witness, Mrs. Rose, noticed a person
of Japanese ancestry. She spoke to this person, and
asked him if he knew the deceased, which he denied.
Another mysterious circumstance was that she
noticed in the cars which gathered after the accident, a gray sedan automoblie similar to the one that
had passed them immediately before the accident.
(R. 122).
The first police officers at the scene were from
South Salt Lake. Lawrence J. Vaughan, one of
the officers, testified that he was chasing another
car north on Main Street when they noticed the
accident and turned around and returned to the
scene (R. 51). This was about 1:45 A.M. After
6
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testifying to the physical surroundings, he testified
he found the body about six feet out from the sidewalk and about forty-five feet from a sign on the
side of the road. He further testified that he examined defendant's automobile and found a dent
on the rim of the headlight on the right side and
some brush marks on the outside of the right hand
fender ( R. 41). The defendant voluntarily submitted to a blood test and it was found to be .034 of one
percent alcoholic content (R. 60).
Two other police officers fron1 South Salt Lake
testified substantially in the same manner. The witness Charles Bowden testified that he observed the
position of the deceased's body and that no part
of her body was at that time any closer to the sidewalk than six feet ( R. 73).
The High\vay Patrolman, Robert D. Nuttal,
arrived at the scene of the accident some time later.
When he arrived, the body had already been moved
(R. 36). He testified that he observed the marks on
the right front fender of the defendant's car, and
also observed a mark on the windshield of the defendant's car as if a rock or some other object had
struck it (R. 40-45).
The defendant testified that almost a year previously he had had an accident involving the right
front fender of his car. After this prior accident,
7
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his car had been repaired, but he had never observed
the right front fender in detail and did not know
whether the marks on the fender testified to by the
police officers were there prior to this night or not
(R. 104). The defendant gave the investigating ofa statement, which appears in appellant's brief and
which is in accord with his testimony herein, to the
effect that he was driving along south Main Street
south of Twenty-First South when something hit
his windshield immediately after a car had passed
him. The object chipped his windshield and he pulled
to the right and heard another dull sound. Being in
doubt as to what had made the sound, he stopped
his car and got out to see vvhat the trouble was,
when he found the woman and various articles on
the road. The woman was injured, and he had instructed the first car that stopped to call the police
and ambulance.
The jury was instructed by the court, whose
instructions appear on pages 150 to 165, and after
deliberating, returned a verdict in the defendant's
favor of no cause of action.
This appeal is addressed to the giving of one
instruction and the failure to give another, which
we will discuss in that order.

8
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 7 PERTAINING TO TI-lE
.iRULES OF LAW GOVERNING PERSONS ON HIGHWAYS.
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT TI-IE DECEDENT WAS PRESUJ\1ED TO BE EXERCISING DUE
CARE AT Tl-IE TIME OF HER DEATH.

ARGUMENT
POil~T

I. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 7 PERTAINING TO THE
RULES OF LAW GOVERNING PERSONS ON HIGHWAYS.

The instructions to the jury in this case follo-\v the usual pa tterne First the jury is instructed
as to the claims and allegations of the parties and
the burden of proof. !~ext the general terms, "negligence," "contributory negligence," and "proximate
cause" are defined. Then the jury is instructed as
to specific claims of negligence. In this regard,
Instruction No. 6 instructed the jury that the defendant in the operation of his automobile was required to operate the same in accordance with the
follovving:
"1. You are instructed that a driver
shall not turn a vehicle from the traveled
course on a highway unless he first ascertains
that such movement can be made with reasonable safety.
"2. You are instructed that a driver of
a vehicle upon a highway is required to main9
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tain and keep a proper lookout for other vehicles and pedestrians upon the highway, so
as to avoid colliding with other persons on the
highway or persons standing next to the traveled portion of the same when such person
sees, or in the exercise of reasonable care,
should observe those persons. In this connection it is no excuse for a driver to say that he
did not see, if in the exercise of reasonable
care he should have seen.
"3. You are instructed that every driver of an automobile shall operate the same
so that he has said automobile under safe,
proper, and immediate control, so as to avoid
colliding with other vehicles or pedestrians
lawfully using the highway.
"4. You are instructed that is is unlawful for the driver of a motor vehicle to
operate the same while said driver is under
the influence of intoxicating liquor and, in
this connection, you are instructed that such
driver is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor when he has consumed the same to the
extent that it appreciably affects his mental
or physical faculties in the operation of said
automobile."
Instruction No. 7, which is complained of by
the appellants, was as follows:
''Instruction No. 7. You are instructed
that the deceased in the exercise of ordinary
care, and in order not to be guilty herself of
contributory negligence, was governed by the
following rules of law at the time and place
in question.
"1. You are instructed that it was the
10
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duty of the deceased in undertaking to cross
the highway, if you should believe that she
was so doing, to keep a reasonable and adequate lookout for automobiles using the street
and to use reasonable and ordinary care to
keep out of the way of such automobiles. In
this connection it was her duty to look and observe whether there were any automobiles in
such close proximity as to affect her safety
and to continue to keep such a reasonable
and prudent lookout as was reasonably necessary for her own protection.
"2. You are instructed that if you find
from the evidence that the deceased was crossing the street at the time of the accident, or
was commencing to cross the street and continued on, it was her duty to exercise ordinary care to ascertain her surroundings and
the vehicles upon the highway at said time
and not to remain in a place of danger, or
otherwise fail to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for her own safety.
"3. You are instructed that a pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other
than within a marked crosswalk or within an
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection should
yield the right of way to all vehicles lawfully
upon the highway. Therefore, it was the duty
of said deceased to yield the right of way to
vehicles upon the street if you find that she
was crossing or commencing to cross the street
under the above circumstances.
"4. You are instructed that it is unlawful for any person to walk upon a roadway
where sidewalks are provided adjacent to the
highway.
11
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. ''You are,. therefore, instructed that if
you find by a preponderance of the evidence
.. that the deceased failed to observe any of the
.above rules .of Jaw respecting her conduct and
. that. her failure proximately contributed to
the happening of the collision then and in that
event the plaintiffs herein would not be en. titled to recover for her death."
The question is whether this instruction was
proper in view· of the evidence that the deceased
was· anywhere froni six·· to somewhat more· than
fifteen feet on the highway at a point other than
within a marked crosswalk or within an un1narked
cross walk at an intersection and may have been
directly in defend9-nt's lane of traffic. In a case
directly on point, 'Barry, Bt al, v. Maddalena, et al,
(Cal.) 146 P. 974, decided in 1944, ~he facts, as
stated in the 'vords of the court, vvere:
"About 11:30 P~M. on the night of July
30th,, 1942; .defendant, Clem Maddalena, and
his minor son, .Clemente, were proceeding
northerly. iri the father's Chevrolet on U. S.
Highway 101, with Clemente in the driver's
. seat. The weather was clear of fog or cloud
and t~e p~verpent was dry as they approached
the city of Santa Marguerita. The concrete
highway was. divided in the center by a white
.. strip. Ori · each .side was a six foot smooth
··shoulder. They were still in the open country
'traveling. at about forty-five miles. per hour
. when· another automobile Vvith glaring headlights, going southerly, passed then1. On approaching the southbOU11d vehicle, Clemente
lowered the.. beam of his headlights. \Vithin
12
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less than six seconds after passing the southbound car, the Chevrolet collided with the deceased. The left fender and lamp struck him,
indicating that deceased was east of the highway's center. The collision was the first knowledge defendants had of the presence of any
object on the pavement, notwithstanding both
of them had been on the lookout just prior to
the impact."
The plaintiffs complained that there was no
evidence justifying the submission of instructions
having to do with contributory negligence. The
court said:
"Not only was the finding of Clemente's
freedom from negligence justified, but the
evidence warranted the implied finding of
the contributory negligence of deceased.
Whether deceased by his own negligent act
caused his collision with the Chevrolet was
a question for the jury. If deceased had been
walking southward, he was presumptively
negligent in violating the rule which requires
that a pedestrian on the highway in the open
country walk close to the left-hand edge. Vehicle Code, Section 564, St. 1935, p. 188. If
he had been northward bound, he should have
been on the outside of the westly lane. Ibid.
On the other hand, the jury may have determined that the deceased was attempting to
cross from the west side to the east side of the
highway at a point where there was no crosswalk and without yielding the right of way.
Two established facts warranted such determination ; ( 1 ) His position, when struck, in
the easterly lane of the center strip; and
(2) Neither defepdant saw him. If he did
13
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attempt to cross as the Chevrolet was approaching, he should have yielded the right
of way and in failing to do so, he was negligent. Sec. 562, Vehicle Code. Under the circumstances, a finding that such act contributed to the accident is amply justified. It
follows that if the jury found that the headlights of the Chevrolet did not comply with
the rule requiring that its lighting beams
have sufficient intensity to reveal a person
at a distance of one hundred feet ahead, Sec.
648, Vehicle Code, St. 1939, p. 1603, still
upon other facts, the jury may properly have
found that the negligence of deceased justified a denial of recovery."
Speaking specifically of the instructions, the
court said :
·
"The third assignment is that there was
no evidence justifying defendants' proposed
instructions 11, 12, and 14. No. 11 sets forth
the provisions of Section 564, and declares
that if deceased violated such provisions, he
was negligent as a matter of law, and if such
act was a proximate cause of the accident,
plaintiff cannot recover. No. 12 recites (1)
that the duty of a pedestrian to yield the right
of way while crossing a highway at a point
other than a crosswalk area may call for a
higher degree of care than applied when he
crosses at a regular crosswalk; ( 2) that if
the deceased failed to exercise the degree of
care of a reasonably prudent person in cross!
ing at a point where he does not have the
right of way, he was guilty of negligence as
a matter of law; and ( 3) that if such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident,
plaintiffs cannot recover. No. 14 declared
14
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that the degree of care required of deceased
was that of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances; that a reasonably
prudent person would have known that by
virtue of the darkness and color of his clothing, it would be difficult for the motorist to
observe him there; that therefore a greater
degree of care was imposed upon the deceased
under the circumstances if such were found
to have existed.
"Appellants do not say that the criticized
instructions embody erroneous statements of
law. Their claims are that there is no evidence justifying 11, and that in attempting
to apply the law by 14, the court effectually
told the jury that they might find deceased
had violated Eection 564, although no witnesses.had seen him before the impact.
"In making such claims, appellants are
in error. Both 11 and 12 were given because
of the proof that deceased, while in the open
country and in the easterly lane of the highway, was struck by the left lamp of the
·Chevrolet, proceeding northerly. No. 12 is a
fair attempt to apply Section 564 to the very
facts in evidence. Instruction 10 quoted and
correctly applied Section 562.
"Such instructions were properly g·iven to
aid the jury in the event they should determine from the evidence that the deceased in
violation of two code sections was either crossing the highway or walking in defendant's
lane of travel. The fact that there were no
living witnesses to the impact was no reason
for rejecting the instructions. The physical
facts were sufficient to prove that deceased
15
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was about two feet east of the center strip.
If_ he stopped east just after the southbound
car passed, Clemente's vision was at that instant dimmed. The circumstances warranted
the instructions."
In an Oregon case which appears at 284 P. (2)
1041, wherein a petition for a rehearing was denied
at 286-P. (2) 656, the name of the case being Lemons
v. Holland, a judgment was returned for the death
of a p~destrian who was struck by an automobile
during the nighttime at a point two. feet from the
center line of the highway in the motorist's lane of
traffic. The Supreme Court reversed the case with
directions to enter judgment for the defendant.
Quoting from the case which appears at 286 P. (2)
656, the court had this to say about the physical
evidence:
"As we originally pointed out, the physical facts in this case demonstrate without
any question that the impact occurred at least
three feet north of the center line of the highway; the broken glass and radio aerial lay on
and to the south of the center line. How this
debris got there, no on~ knows, nor could
·know, except that it \Vas thrown by and from
the rapidly moving vehicle at some moment
following the impact. When decedent's body
was thrown from contact with the car, it was
thrown in a diagonal direction (southerly
and westerly) to the south edge of the pav:ement, although the automobile kept moving
in a direct line westerly. It n1ay be that the
glass and radio aerial were also so thrown.
16
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Many speculative conjectures might be made
as to just what happened and how it happened, with one guess as good as another, but
actions for negligence are not determined by
mere guess work."
As to whether or not the deceased was guilty
of contributory negligence under these circumstances, the court said, still quoting from 286 P. (2)
656:
"However, under the established facts of
this case, we are firmly convinced that decedent was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. 16 Am. Jur. 207, Sec. 302,
supra. There is no evidence whatever respecting the actions of decedent immediately prior
to the impact. All that is known is that at
the instant of impact, he was perhaps in an
upright position on the high\vay, approximately three feet north of the center line thereon. In the light of the known facts and applicable law of this case, and in the total absence
of evidence, direct or circumstantial, to explain or justify decedent's presence on the
pavement at the time and place he was struck
by the rapidly moving vehicle, if indeed it
would be possible to give any reasonable explanation, the conclusion is inescapable that
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence. The presumption of due care cannot
save him from that finding as, under the
known facts and circumstances of this case,
that presumption is overcome as a matter
of law. On this straight stretch of highway
in wide open country where the headlights
of approaching automobiles could be seen for
long distances, it is inconceivable that a
17
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pedestrian could be hit by one traveling in a
straight line on its own side of the road if he
exercised even the slightest degree of care
for his own safety."
In a Washington case, Allen v. Hart, 201 P.
(2) 145, (1948) the facts and holding of the court
were
"Claude Eugene Allen died as a result
of a collision with an automoblie driven by
. D. E. Hart. A suit by the administratrix of
Allen's estate was commenced under the provisions of our wrongful death statute, Rem.
, Rev. Stat. Sees. 183 and 183-1. A substantial
verdict was returned against Mr. Hart and
his wife. From a judgment entered on that
verdict, the Harts have appealed.
"The respondents' theory of the case,
supported by disinterested· witnesses, was that
Mr. Allen was crossing the street at an unmarked crosswalk when he was struck and
fatally injured. The appellants testified that
Mr. Allen was not in the crosswalk when he
was hit. The locus of the collision was the
most important single factor of the accident,
for upon it depended the vital question of
who had the right of way.
"The trial court properly instructed that
if Mr. Allen was on a crosswalk, he had the
right of way, but refused to give an instruction to the effect that if he was crossing the
street at other than the crosswalk, it was his
obligation to yield the right of way to all vehicles on the roadway. This denied the appellants' right to have· their theory of the case
18
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presented to the jury and was prejudicial
error.
The respondents' only attempted justification of the court's failure to instruct upon
the appellants' theory of the case was that
(a) Mr. Allen's having died without regain-·
ing consciousness following his injury, there
was a presumption that he exercised due care
for his own safety; (b) all the disinterested
testimony was that he was in the crosswalk
when he was hit; and (3) the interested testimony of the appellants that Mr. Allen was
not in the crosswalk was not sufficient to remove the presumption of due care, which is
patently fallacious. There is no presumption
of due care in this case, numerous witnesses,
interested and disinterested, having testified
as to how and where the collision occurred."
The evidence in Rios v. Benr;~ett, (Cal.) 200 P.
(2) 73, decided in 1948, was that decedent was
struck when approximately ten feet from the south
curbline of Fifth Street and in the south traffic
lane, used by vehicles traveling in an easterly direction. He was thrown in the air by the impact,
carried several feet to the east, and died before the
ambulance arrived. There was a marked pedestrian
crosswalk crossing Fifth Street on the west side of
Cabrera Street, but none between Cabrera and Ramona Streets where decedent attempted to cross.
The trial court in that case did hold that it was error
to give an instruction to the effect that if deceased
looked towards defendant's automobile before he
19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stepped out onto the street and failed to see it, he
was guilty of negligence if defendant's automobile
was in his immediate vicinity and in plain sight,
where there was no evidence that the deceased pedestrian looked or did not look before he stepped out
onto the street. However, the court held that the
giving of this instruction was not prejudicial and
then went on to say:
"The jury was fully instructed as to the
duty of decedent while crossing the street.
The law placed upon him the continuing duty
to exercise ordinary care and to avoid an
accident after he left the sidewalk and at all
times while crossing the street. (Citations
given) . The instructions when read as a whole
left the question of contributory negligence
on the part of the decedent for the determination of the jury as a question of fact. There
was .substantial evidence that the decedent
crossed the street into the south lane of traffic without taking adequate precautions before doing so, and that he either did not look
to the west for approaching cars, or if he did
so look, he failed to see what was in plain
sight, and there was no reason why he could
not have paused to let the car pass by and
yield the right of way as required by law.
The implied finding of the jury that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence
which proximately contributed to his injury
and death is amply supported by the evidence.
(Citations given). And its finding under all
the circumstances of this case is conclusive
on appeal.''
20
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In a Montana case cited in appelants' brief,
Garrison v. Trowbridge, 177 P. (2) 464, the accident occurred at an intersection. The specific intruction objected to was to the effect that, "You
are instructed that all traffic, including pedestrians;
must, when they approach an intersection of a city
street in the City of Great Falls, and Second Avenue
North, the same being a through street, stop and
look before entering such intersection for the purpose of crossing the avenue." The court held that
there was no evidence that the deceased in this
~ase did not stop before entering the intersection
and that, therefore, the giving of that instruction
was In error.
We do not disagree with the decision in the
Montana case, nor the other cases cited in appellants' brief to the effect that instructions must be
predicated upon evidence in the case, and in the
absence of evidence, instructions should not be given.
However, we feel that this is not the situation in
the case before the court. The evidence in this case
is that the decedent was on the highway at the time
she was struck, and that she may have been as far
as slightly in excess of fifteen feet and directly in
the defendant's lane of traffic, that being the outside lane for southbound cars. This is evidence, and it
is sufficient to support a finding that the deceased
v;as guilty of contributory negligence· which proxi21
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mately caused her own death if believed by the jury.
This being the case, the instructions as to the deceased's right to be on the highway were properly
.
g1ven.
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DECEDENT WAS PRESUMED TO BE EXERCISING DUE
CARE AT THE TIME OF HER DEATH.

The plaintiffs and appellants' assertion that
the deceased was entitled to a presumption that she
'vas exercising due care for her own safety and that
the jury should have been so instructed is based on
the premise that there was no evidence that the
deceased was guilty of any negligence which the
jury might reasonably find was a proximate cause
of her death. Since the premise upon which it rests
is erroneous, as we have already seen, the general
proposition itself must also fail. The situation is
discussed in the three cases cited in appellants'
brief, Tuttle v. P.l.E., 242 P. ( 2) 764, --------------Utah
______________ ; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 249 P. ( 2) 213, _____________ _
Utah ____________ ~_·; and -Mecham v. Allen, 262 P. (2)
285, 1 Utah (2) 79. It is also discussed in another
case, Cox v. Thompson, 254 P. ( 2) 104 7, _____________ _
Utah ______________ ~ This Court held in Tuttle v. P.I.E., supra, that
the presumption was overcome where the jury could
reasonably find from the evidence that the decedent
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turned. his car suddenly and without worning. In
that case the Court held:
"Here the jury could reasonably find
1
from the evidence that the decedent was driving his car toward the south and turned his
car suddenly and without warning into the
course of the tractor-trailor when it was too
late to avoid an accident, and in so doing,
he did not use core for his own safety. So the
presumption was thereby destroyed, and instructing the jury thereon could only confuse, rather than enlighten them, but this
was not prejudicial."
Plaintiffs contended in Gibbs v. Blue Cab,
supra:
"That the trial court's conclusion that
the deceased was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law was erroneous since the presumption that he was using due care for his
own safety was not rebutted by the defendant,
and (2) that under the facts the question of
(a) contributory negligence, and (b) whether
deceased's negligence, if any shown, was a
proximate cause of the collision, properly
were matters for the jury."
The action arose out of an intersectional collision between defendant's taxi cab and a bicycle
ridden by plaintiff's decedent while it was dark.
There was no lamp on the bicycle as required by
a City Ordinance and a State Statute, and some
other evidence of negligence on the deceased's part.
The Court, while holding that the question of wheth23
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er or not the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence should have been submitted to the jury,
also held that the presumption of due care on the deceased's part had been overcome by the aforementioned evidence of negligence and no longer re1nai:ned
in the case. Justice Wade in a concurring opinion
said:
"The presumption that the person injured used due care for his own safety has
no bearing on this case. Such presumption
merely places on the adversary the burden of
going forward with the evidence and making
a prima facie case on that issue. It disappears
form the case as soon as sufficient ev1uence
is produced from which the fact trier could
reasonably find that the deceased failed to
use due care, although it is sometimes argued
and the language of some decisions seems to
indicate that express eye vvritness testimony of
the actions of the favored party at the time
in question is necessary in order to overcon1e
such presumptions. Such is not the case where
the burden of going forward with the evidence may be overcome by circumstantial
evidence, for a prima facie case can be established by circumstantial evidence the same
as by direct testimony. This is the Thayeriat
theory subscribed by Wigmore, and in this
kind of a case by Morgan, and adopted by the
American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, and apparently approved by this Court
by a long line of cases.·
"From the evidence produced in this
case, the jury could reasonably find that, decedent rode his bicycle into an intersection
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with a through highway and a stop sign
against him during the nighttime, without
the statutory or ordinance required lights
and without ascertaining that defendant's cab
was approaching so nearly as to constitute
an immediate hazard until it was too late to
avoid the collision, and in so doing, he was
guilty of negligence which proximately caused
or contributed to causing the accident and his
death. Such being the case, the presumption
that he used due care for his own safety has
no effect on this case."
"There is another reason why this presumption does not affect the result in this
case. I!ere the defendant had the burden of
persuading the trier of the facts that decedent
was guilty of contributory negligence which
proximately caused his death. Such being defendant's burden, he, without the presumption has the burden of not only going forward
with the evidence, but also of persuading the
trier of decedant's fault. So, since defendant
not only has the burden of going forward
with the evidence, but of persuading the jury
on that question, such presumption would not
affect the defendant's burden at all."
The presumption was held to be overcome in
Cox v. Thompson, supra, by evidence that the decedent, dressed in dark clothes, while walking across
a poorly lighted highway at night, walked directly
into the path of an automobile being drive by the
defendant. The court said:
"If the presumption that a person in a
place of danger exercises due care for his own
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safety applies in this case, it will be extinguished if the evidence properly sustains
the finding that decedant was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law."

Mecham v. Allen, supra, was an action for the
death of a motorist and injuries sustained by his
wife and children in a collision between motorist's
automobile and a tractor-trailer owned by one defendant and driven by another. It appeared that
the left front of the automobile had collided on an
incline curve with the left side of the tractor-trailer
just behind the cab. There was a conflict in the evidence as to which automobile was on its proper side
of the highway at the time of the accident. The court
held that under these circumstances, it was error
to give an instruction as follows:
"You are instructed that, until the contrary is proven, there is a presumption that
the deceased, Thomas Udell Mecham, was exercising due and proper care for the protection of his person and the preservation of his
life, at the time of the accident; this presumption arises from the instinct of self-preservation and the disposition of man to avoid personal harm. This presumption is not conclusive but is a matter to be considered by the
jury in a connection with all other facts and
circumstances in the case in determining
whether or not the deceased, Thomas Udell
Mecham, was guilty of contributory negligence at the time of the accident."
Holding that the defendants had made a prima
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facie case that decedent's car was on the wrong side
of the road at the time of the accident, but not so
strong that it would be unreasonable, in view of all
the evidence, to find the facts against them, the
court went on to say:
"A presumption deals with a rule of law
which requires the trier of the facts to assume
the existence of one fact or a set of facts (herein called the presumed facts) from the establishment of another fact or set of facts (herein
called the basic facts). Unless the basic facts
are conclusively shown to exist, that question,
if material, should be submitted to the jury.
* * * From the basic fact that a human being was accidentally killed, a presumption
arises which requires the trier of the facts
to assume the presumed facts, and that decedent u~ed due care for his ovvn safety, in
the absence of a prima facie showing to the
contrary, but in this kind of a presumption
upon the making of such showing, the presumption disappears from and becomes wholly
inoperative in the case, and the trial from
then on should proceed exactly the same as
though n opresumption ever existed, or had
any effect on the case.
"Such a presumption deals only with the
burden of going forward with or the production of evidence. The question of whether a
prima facie case has been made is the same
here as in all other cases, a question for the
court and not the jury to determine. It is established whenever sufficient evidence is produced from which its existence could be
reasonably found. Of course, it is immaterial
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which party produces such evidence. If the
court concludes that a prima facie case has
been made, it should submit the question of
the existence of the presumed facts to the
jury on the evidence without commenting or
mentioning to them that there was or is such
a presumption. If the court concludes that no
prima facie showing of the non-existence of
the presumed facts has been made, he should
direct the jury to assume the existence of the
presumed facts, or if such facts are detern1inative of the whole case, he should direct a
verdict in accordance therewith.
*

*

*

*

*

*

"Since defendants' evidence was clearly
sufficient to make the prima facie case, the
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence
which proximately caused the accident, the
presumption was eliminated from the case,
and it was error for the court to instruct the
jury on that question. But was it prejudicial?
·With the presumption eliminated, the defendants still had the burden of persuading the
jury that decedent was guilty of contributory
negligence which proximately caused the accident. The jury was elsewhere so instructed.
Thus defendants not only had the burden of
going forward with the evidence, but of persuading the jury on that issue. So in cases
where the questio11 of proving contributory
negligence is involved, this presumption can
never of any aid to the representatives of
the deceased, beca11se their opponent without
the presumption has the burden of persuading the jury that he was guilty of such negligence, which is a greater burden than and
includes the burden of going forward with the
evidence."
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So we see that; since the defendant in this type
of a case has the burden of proving contributory negligence or of proving facts on which contributory
negligence might reasonably be found, which burden
is greater than would be imposed upon him by the
requirement that he rebut the presumption that the
deceased exercised due care; there is a question as
to whether or not the jury should ever be instructed
in regard to this presumption. The presumption, that
the deceased exercised due care for his own safety,
appears therefore to be a rule of evidence to guide
the court in trying the case. That is, the court assumes that the deceased exercised due care for his
own safety until that presumption has been rebutted
by a prima facie case to the contrary. If no such
prima facie case is made out and the facts conclusively show negligence on the part of the other
party, the court would be authorized, relying upon
that presumption, to direct the verdict against the
other party. If no such prima facie case to the contrary is made out, but there exists a question of
whether or not the other party is negligent, the court
then, relying on the presumption, might submit the
question of the negligence of the other party to the
jury at the same time instructing the jury to assume the facts established by the presumption.
Where, however, a prima facie case to the contrary
is made out, the presumption disappears and the
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case is tried as though the presumption never existed. Under these circumstances, the presumption
could be of no aid to the representatives of the deceased, since the other party has the burden of proving by a prponderance of the evidence that the deceased did not exercise due care for his own saftey,
which is a greater degree of proof than is required
to rebut the presumption.
In this case, the defendant made out a prima
facie case that the deceased was not exercising due
care for her own safety, or to state it otherwise,
was contributorily negligent, by their evidence that
the deceased was on the highway at a point other
than a marked crosswalk or an un1narked crosswalk
at an intersection and may have been directly in the
defendant's lane of traffic at the time she was
struck. It was not, therefore, error for the Court
to fail to instruct the jury that the deceased was
presumed to be exercising due care for her own
safety.
CONCLUSION
The jury's verdict in this case may be justified
upon a number of assumptions as to what they may
have found. There is some evidence, in view of the
mysterious circumstances surrounding her deaththe fact that she had no reason to be in the place
where she died, and the goings on in the gray Buick
automobile which may have returned to the scene
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of the accident-that the deceased did not meet her
death by reason of any act on the part of the defendant. The jury could have reasonably found that the
defendant was not guilty of negligence in failing to
see the deceased upon the highway at the time and
place of the accident, since the area was very poorly
lighted, the deceased \vas dressed in dark clothing,
and the defendant's attention had voluntarily been
distracted from the road immediately prior to the
accident by an object apparently throw by or from
the passing gray Buick automobile. The jury could
have also found that the decedent was guilty of
negligence which was a proximate cause of her own
death by reason of her being upon the highway at
the time and place of the collision.
There were no eye witnesses to the collision
and it is not known what the deceased was doing on
the highway at the time of her death. However, the
defendant is entitled to the reasonable inferences
to be drawn frorn the fact that she was on the highway. As was said in Olsen v. W arwood, 255 P. ( 2)
725, __________________ Utah __________________ , cited in appellants'
brief, Vlhere the jury was instructed that it should
return a verdict in favor of the defendant if it found
from the evidence that the plaintiff, after having
been discharged from a school bus, ran toward the
side of the bus near the right wheels at a time and
place when the defendant could not see him, in the
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absence of any direct testimony that the plaintiff
had done so:
"There is no testimony in the record stating that plaintiff ran or walked into the side
of defendant's bus. Defendant, however, did
testify that he brought the bus to a complete
stop; that the children, including plaintiff,
were permitted to disembark from the right
front door in safety; that he observed the
plaintiff a good five feet out and away from
the bus before the ·vehicle was put back into
.motion; that the vehicle proceeded on and
away from the plaintiff's position; and that
he observed no child or person close enough
.to plaintiff to push or throw him under the
wheels. This testimony, along with the admitted fact that plaintiff was run over by
the right rear wheels of the bus is sufficient
to support an inference that plaintiff ran or
walked towards the bus after it regained
forward motion. No other inference can be
drawn from defendant's testimony stating
plaintiff was five feet away from the vehicle,
was not thrown or pushed under the vehicle
by a third person or object; was not driven
into by the vehicle; and yet was run over by
the rear wheels of such conveyance. The instruction.permitting the.jury to make such an
inference was not based on non-evidentiary
facts, nor did it permit a finding based on
surmise, conjecture, or speculation. Such instruction, though not a model one, under the
facts before the trial court, did allow a logical
and reasonable finding to be made which was
based on testimony properly in evidence.''
Instruction No. 7 in this case did not presume
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to find any of the facts but only instrcted the jury
in a general way on the deceased's right to be on
the highway and her duties to use care for her own
safety while on the highway, should the jury find
that she was either attempting to cross the highway or was walking upon the highway, which are
the only reasonable and logical inferences which
could be drawn from the fact that she was on the
highway at the time she was struck, unless we presume that she was thrown onto the highway or
dropped on the highway by some third person or
persons, in which event the defendant would not be
responsible, and the instruction would not, therefore, be prejudicial.
The presumption that the deceased was using
due care for her own safety at the time of the accident was overcome by the evidence in this case
from which the jury might reasonably have found
that the deceased was giulty of contributory negligence which was a proximate cause of her own
death.
Even if we assume that such presumption was
still in the case, the jury was otherwise instructed
by the Court in Instruction No. 2 that the defendant
had the burden of showing the deceased guilty of
contributory negligence, and that such negligence
was a proximate cause of her death, by a preponderance of the evidence, which duty was greater
33
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than that of merely rebutting the presumption, so
that the failure to give the instruction as to the presumption, if error, would not be prejudicial.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury in
this case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
and DON J. HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
·· 520 Continental Bank Building
.Salt Lake City, Utah
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